| Ingrian campaign | |||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Part of the Great Northern War | |||||||||
 Ingermanland campaign from August to October 1708 | |||||||||
| |||||||||
| Belligerents | |||||||||
 Tsardom of Russia |
 Swedish Empire | ||||||||
| Commanders and leaders | |||||||||
|
Fyodor Apraksin |
Georg Lybecker Carl Gustaf Armfeldt[1] Johan Baptista Schommer Georg Hastfer | ||||||||
| Units involved | |||||||||
| Placeholder |
Tavastehus regular regiment Six fördubbling battalions Tiesenhausen's regiment | ||||||||
| Strength | |||||||||
| 25,000 men |
Total strength 11,000–12,000 4,750 infantry 2,700–3,000 Saxons 3,000 cavalry 1,500–2,000 non-combatants | ||||||||
| Casualties and losses | |||||||||
| See casualties | See casualties | ||||||||
The Ingrian campaign (Swedish: Ingermanländska fälttåget; Russian: Ингерманландский поход) also called Lybecker's Ingermanland campaign (Swedish: Lybeckers ingermanländska fälttåg)[2] was a failed[3][4][5] Swedish attempt to recapture Ingria and conquer Saint Petersburg from Russia in 1708. Although Lybecker managed to capture the lesser fortress of Koporye, he quickly retreated afterwards, leading to the failure of the campaign.
Background
edit
During the winter and spring of 1708, Georg Lybecker, a Swedish general, prepared to launch a new invasion into Ingria with all the men available to him in order to support Charles XII's war efforts. Lybecker's army only received reinforcement from another part of the empire. It consisted of one regiment and three battalions of infantry which rounded up to around 3,000 men in total, mostly recruited from Saxon prisoners of war who were compelled to enter Swedish service despite the conclusion of peace, since they preferred it over staying in prison.[6][7] Lybecker wrote repeatedly to the king and requested orders and instructions, but this was in vain as he never received a response.[7]
Opposing armies
editSwedish army
editThe strength of the Swedish army had until then not been known with certainty. An estimate put it to be between 11,000 and 12,000 men strong, in addition to a number of non-combatant units. A strength return by Lybecker to the Council from August 10 claimed that his army consisted of around 8,900 men, of which about 500 were ill and were forced to stay in Viborg. The remainder, around 7,750 men, thus made up the field army. It consisted of:[8]
- Tavastehus regular regiment
- Six fördubbling battalions
- Tiesenhausen's regiment
The total amount of cavalry and dragoons available for the campaign were probably around 3,000 strong, possibly higher. The total strength of the army was then most likely around 11,000, 11,600,[4] or 12,000,[9] non-combatants can be assessed to have consisted of around 1,500 to 2,000.[8] Lybecker also had around 2,700 to 3,000 Saxons at his disposal in addition to the other troops.[9][10] These Saxons were led by Johan Baptista Schommer, who had earlier escaped from Moscow in 1704.[6]
Russian army
editAdmiral Apraksin, who was the Russian commander in Ingria, had available to him a much larger army than the Swedes, consisting of around 25,000 men according to Russian estimates, and 23,500 men according to Swedish estimates,[9] but a large part of this army was tied up in the fortrresses stretching from Nöteborg to Narva, and the number of sick was substantial, and thus Apraksin could not risk a battle. However, Apraksin exploited Lybecker's delay and marched his army into eastern Estonia and struck and nearly destroyed a Swedish force of fewer than 2,000 in the Battle of Vinni that was there to cooperate with Lybecker.[11]
Campaign
editBy this time, Lybecker set off from Viborg with his forces, but their march progressed extremely slowly. The summer in 1708 had been unprecedentedly wet, and without additional work the roads were impassable. On 28 August, Lybecker claimed that the Swedish army had only marched 15 Swedish miles. The rain was intense, and the army had an uninterrupted work of filling the roads, constructing bridges, and laying fascines.[12]
However, the Swedes finally managed to reach the Neva, which they crossed forcefully on 30 August in Teusina, making use of their pontoons. The Russian resistance was eventually broken after a bloody struggle, which cost the Swedes 377 dead and wounded, a third of the infantry strength engaged. During the next few days, the entire Swedish army crossed the river with its artillery and supply train.[4][12]
Apraksin viewed the situation as bleak, however, the danger of the campaign was less than he thought. A serious Swedish assault on Saint Petersburg was next-to impossible, as no siege artillery had been brought and the progress of the campaign thus far had shown that in the absence of instructions from the king, Lybecker had no real plan. Aimlessness and rising difficulties with provisions paralysed the Swedish army, and by burning the countryside and through Lybeckers passive response, Apraksin had managed to turn Lybecker from an attacker into a "bewildered refugee"[12]
Expedition to Karhila
editAfter crossing the Neva, Lybecker sought to gather supplies for the Swedish army. To this end, he went on an expedition against Duderhof, where the Russians had previously established a large magazine. On 5 September at Karhila, which was a few kilometers north-east of Duderhof, a Swedish detachment of 800 encountered a unit of Russian dragoons which was promptly routed after several charges by the Swedes. The Colonel's Carl Armfeldt and Georg Hastfer are mentioned as the leaders of the attack. The Swedish losses were insignificant, numbering around 1 killed and a few wounded, the Russians however, counted 46 killed, and 10 taken prisoner. However, the main Swedish goal ended in failure, as the magazine at Duderhof along with other supply depots in the area had been burned by the Russians.[12][2]
Aftermath
editCasualties
editSwedish losses
editRussian losses
editNotes
editReferences
edit- ^ Syrjö.
- ^ a b Uddgren, H.E. "Carl G Armfeldt". sok.riksarkivet.se. National Archives of Sweden. Retrieved 2024-07-05.
- ^ Syrjö, Veli-Matti. "ARMFELT, Karl Gustaf". www.blf.fi. Biografiskt lexikon för Finland. Retrieved 2024-07-05.
- ^ a b c Glete, Jan (2010). Swedish Naval Administration, 1521-1721: Resource Flows and Organisational Capabilities. BRILL. p. 207. ISBN 978-90-04-17916-5.
- ^ Holm, Björn (2017-04-03). De svarta ryttarna (in Swedish). Wahlström & Widstrand. ISBN 978-91-46-23188-2.
- ^ a b Blomqvist, Olof (2018-04-20). "Krigsfångar tvingades slåss för Karl XII". Populär Historia (in Swedish). Populär Historia. Retrieved 2024-07-05.
- ^ a b Hornborg 2021, p. 77.
- ^ a b Hornborg 2021, p. 78.
- ^ a b c Åstrand, Sven. "Georg Lybecker". sok.riksarkivet.se. National Archives of Sweden. Retrieved 2024-07-05.
- ^ Starbäck, Carl Georg; Bäckström, Per Olof. "136 (Berättelser ur svenska historien / Sjunde bandet. Carl XII)". runeberg.org (in Swedish). Retrieved 2024-07-05.
- ^ Hornborg 2021, p. 78–79.
- ^ a b c d Hornborg 2021, p. 79.
Works cited
edit- Hornborg, Eirik (2021). CARL GUSTAV ARMFELT AND THE STRUGGLE FOR FINLAND DURING THE GREAT NORTHERN WAR. Translated by Faithfull, Erik. Helion & Company. pp. 77–82. ISBN 9781913336479.
- Sundberg, Ulf (1998). Svenska krig 1521-1814 [Swedish wars 1521-1814] (in Swedish). Hjalmarson & Högberg. p. 301. ISBN 9789189080140.
- N.R, Slavnitsky. "Славнитский Н.Р. К вопросу о потерях русских войск при обороне Санкт-Петербурга в 1708 г." [Slavnitsky N.R. On the issue of losses of Russian troops during defense St. Petersburg in 1708]. cyberleninka. pp. 258–264.