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Action at Tsari
Part of Kashmir Conflict and the Indo-Pakistani war of 1947–1948
Date 11-12th February 1948[1] Location Tsari near Skardu, Pakistan 35°28′12″N 75°24′50″E / 35.4699°N 75.41393°E / 35.4699; 75.41393 Result Gilgit scouts victory[2] Outposts at Tsari eliminated[3] All State troops eliminated[4]
Belligerents
Dominion of Pakistan	Dominion of India Jammu and Kashmir
Commanders and leaders
Maj.Ehsan Ali Liet.Babar Capt.Khan Jarral	Capt.Krishan †[5] Capt.Nek Alam (Later defected)
Units involved
Gilgit Scouts Ibex Force A wing D Wing Muslim Deserters	State forces 6 J&K Infantry
Strength
Intial Strength: ~2 Platoons,[6] (250 men) After defection: ~3 Platoons	Intial Strength: ~2 Platoons After defection: ~1 Platoon
Casualties and losses
Unknown	All Killed

Action at Tsari took place during the Indo-Pakistani war of 1947–1948 in the Gilgit-Baltistan sector at Tsari near Skardu, in February 11-12th 1948, Involving Gilgit scouts and the Jammu and Kashmir forces, the Ibex force of the Gilgit Scouts would plan an assault on the Tsari outposts, which were established by Colonel Sher Jung Thapa.

In the past Skardu was comprised of Large tehsils in which there were five subdivisions and each of the subdivision was governed by a local jagirdar known as Rajas.^[7] The route through Gilgit-Bunji area to Rondu was of concern to state forces since it posed a threat compared to other three directions which were protected and were surrounded by Mountains and ranges.^[7]

During the First Kashmir war, Commander of 6th Jammu and Kashmir infantry Colonel Majid Khan was also arrested in the Coup staged by the Gilgit scouts against the Gilgit Governor, Thus Major. Sher Jung Thapa would be promoted to the rank of Lieutenant colonel and would be ordered to move to Skardu from Leh on November 21.^[8] Colonel Thapa would then setoff for Skardu on November 23 along his Two Sikh platoons and by 2 December would reached Skardu which would make up total four platoons including already two platoons present under Captain Nek Alam at Skardu.^[8] They would arrive before the Gilgit scouts to prepare for holding off the scouts and obtaining relief columns and securing Skardu. The scouts would advance for Skardu in February-March only after dealing with an unrest caused by Shia as an reaction to Sunni dominance in Gilgit.^[8]

The Muslim Captain Nek Alam would receive letters from Captain Hassan Khan, which was written for him and was delivered by two men from Astore region.^[9] In the letter Captain Hassan urged Captain Nek Alam to take arms against the State forces, However Captain Nek would report this to local authorities.^[9] In response to this Outposts would be established at Tsari pass in the Rondu region by Colonel. Thapa as a first line of defense and warn the forces stationed at Skardu against a attack, the location itself had tactical importance since the river Indus ran between the two precipitous hills and was considered great for fighting.^[9] The columns under the code (Ibex column) led by Major Ehsan would gather up at the village of Harmosh, after they made progress from Bunji to Skardu.^[10]

The Muslim troops belonging to Jammu and Kashmir sector abandoned the state forces, which were kept for the purpose of guides, among them a Muslim soldier reached Istak by a swollen cow-skin and told Major Ehsan that the Muslims at the right bank were secure meanwhile on the left were being massacred by state forces.^[11] Three hundred civilians were willingly gathered by the Raja of Rondu and were stationed at both sides of the Indus river banks at Wasola and Harkoya which resulted in all of Rondu become free from the State troops excluding Bagicha, Garbidas and Tongudas.^[9] The people in Skardu refused to coordinate with the State administrator and awaited for the Gilgit scouts arrival, Captain Hassan Khan fully assured the Raja of Rondu of relief forces.^[9]

The Ibex force was based on two wings, A wing comprised of one hundred men led by Captain Muhammad Jarral and the "D" wing comprised of one hundred fifty men led by Lieutenant Babar Khan, Major Ehsan would be in overall command of the troops.^[12] After gathering at the location Harmush on February 29th, the "D" wing would come after the "A" wing which would keep on progressing.^[12] The Raja of Rondu would be kept in touch through the newly assigned Political agent of Gilgit-Baltistan named Wazir Wilayat Ali.^[12]

Captain Ganga Singh along two section's were dispatched towards Rondu by Colonel Thapa after being informed of the arrival of Ibex force which reached Istak on 4th February.^[12] The plan would be foiled by the Muslim portion of the force which was monitoring the situation, exchange of fire convinced Captain Ganga Singh to retreat back to Skardu.^[12] Captain Nek Alam would join along the Ibex force and would detail Major Ehsan regarding the State forces situation making their position fragile.^[12] An assault on Tsari was to be launched by the scouts in the hours of darkness with a platoon dispatched to Qomera avert any relief forces incoming from Skardu.^[12]

Another Platoon under the command of Captain Nek Alam were stationed at Katzarah to prevent any reinforcement from this side, A platoon belonging to "A" wing of Ibex force would arrive at the other side of the river to Block any attempt for the retreat of the State troops.^[12] The Assault was however brought about by an accident, Lieutenant Babar was to be informed of the order to halt at Garbidas but the orders were not received by Lieutenant Babar.^[13] This column would as a result would be spotted by the State forces when the "D" wing carried the assault at Tsari.^[13] There would be shelling from both sides involving the "D" wing and State troops, Meanwhile Major Ehsan himself would depart towards Skardu and left a segment of troops above Tsari village to prevent the State troops from retreat towards Skardu.^[12]

Captain Krishan Singh realized his vulnerable position and would quietly along his troops sneak out of their Position and relocate to a rocky den which would dominate the previous position.^[14] False reports among the Gilgit scouts were spread by a Muslim troop loyal to the State forces stating that a Large scale attack was to be launched by the state forces.^[15] This caused unrest and persuaded the scouts commander to fallback to a safe position except the soldier Bakhtawar Shah who was convinced it was a deceiving tactic by Krishan Singh to flee.^[15] Bakhtawar Shah did not fall for the rumor and then traced the state troops to their new position by following the foot prints of the State troops and it resulted in the surrender of the state under Krishan Singh after they were surrounded.^[16]

Captain Krishan Singh and his troops attempted to flee, after they surrendered, they noticed that the scouts were less in numbers than what they expected.^[17] It led to face-to-face combat in which all the state troops were killed, including Captain Krishan Singh.^[17] After this engagement all of Rondu fell to the Gilgit scouts and the Muslim soldiers of the Skardu Garrison were gradually making attempts to run free from the state administration.^[12] The thorough assistance received by the Ibex force in their progress, from the Raja of Rondu and the details of the State troops given by the Muslim soldiers led to the Capture of all of Rondu and victory of the Ibex Force at Tsari.^[18]

Since runners were the sole means of communication from Skardu and Tsari none of the State troops returned to Skardu to inform of the attack, Colonel Thapa was unaware of the situation at Tsari. After the Assault at Tsari the Ibex force advanced for their ultimate goal of launching an assault on Skardu which was held by State troops. The Ibex force would regroup at Qomera under Major Ehsan on February 12th and would be split into two forces. A plan was laid by Major Ehsan in which the main column of the force would progress along the right side of the bank, meanwhile Captain Nek Alam and lieutenant Babar would form a Foothold for the Main column to cross the bank. Havildar Sher Muhammad was instructed to bring all the boats available at Skardu to a accessible location and was also instructed to gather all Muslim at Sondus before the launch of the assault.

The force which had departed from Srinagar on January 13th 1948, led by Captain Prabhat Singh, Lieutenant Ajit Singh and Bhagat Singh by now had arrived at Skardu on 10th February. The relief column had faced many hurdles due to intense winter caused casualties and slowed down progress, the relief column returned back to Srinagar midway after being told by numerous locals about the dangers of the journey. The relief column would again embark on the journey unwillingly, after receiving instructions and this time they would reach Skardu in a grievous condition. The Assault on Skardu would be launched on the Midnight of 11 and 12 February.

These disparate elements were stiffened and officered by the regulars from Pak Army It speaks volumes for the organizing ability and leadership of these Pak Army officers who wielded together such a heterogeneous group of highly temperamental people into an effective and efficient fighting outfit, making sure that their potential as guerrilla fighters adept at hit and run tactics was retained in its entirety and fully exploited

— M.N Gulati, Military Plight Of Pakistan Vol I Ii, Pg: 66

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