[1]      Karima Manji has pleaded guilty before me to the following charge:

[2]      Counsel provided the Court with an agreed statement of facts and several exhibits to support the following facts:

[3]      Ms. White, for the Crown, takes the position that a sentence of 18-24 months incarceration, plus 1-year probation (with 60 hrs of community services), and a stand-alone restitution order of $28,254.05 is an appropriate sentence in this matter. In support of their position, the Crown has filed several cases where the sentences imposed ranged between 18-36 months. Specifically, in two cases of note, 36-month periods of jail were imposed in situations where the offenders had previous convictions for fraud.

[4]      The Defence’s primary submission is to accede to the length of the sentence but submitting that it should be served conditionally. The Defence’s alternate submission is that a reformatory sentence in the range of 9-12 months would be appropriate if it is to be a straight-carceral sentence. Mr. Cowan, counsel for Ms. Manji, also agrees that a full restitution order is appropriate, and indicates to the Court that Ms. Manji has already reimbursed $130,000.00 to Kakivak Association.

[5]      Sentencing an offender is a fact-specific exercise and the choice of an appropriate sentence is driven by my evaluation of the unique variables in this case. The determination of a just and appropriate sentence is a highly individualized exercise that goes beyond a purely mathematical calculation. Everything depends on the gravity of the offence, the offender’s degree of responsibility, and the specific circumstances of each case. The punishment must fit the crime.

[6]      In considering the appropriate sentence in this case, I must:

[7]      In this case, regarding the crime committed, in my view, falsely representing oneself as Indigenous for financial or other benefits is a major crime in Canada. Ms. Manji’s moral culpability is at its’ highest level. She not only contrived and premeditated this, she continued for a long period of time, well after the NTI enrolment cards were obtained. Further, her moral culpability is very high because of the insult to the Noah family and the pain inflicted on them.

[8]      Defence asks for a CSO, and they cite several factors in support of their position:

[9]      In addition, Defence counsel provided the Court with caselaw, at pages 11 and 12 of his materials, where offenders received a community-based sentence for offences of fraud. Subsidiarily, counsel proposes 2 cases where the offenders received sentences of under 12 months of jail for similar offences.

[10]   After having reviewed these cases, I realise that all of them, except two, involve first offenders, which is not the case for Ms. Manji. As mentioned, there are two cases involving offenders with a prior criminal record, but the priors are either dated, not related (ex. a DUI prior) or are minimal compared to Ms. Manji’s prior record.

[11]   During argument, Defence counsel took the position that Ms. Manji’s March of Dimes fraud conviction should not operate in law as a previous conviction for the purpose of aggravating or increasing the penalty she should receive for this case involving NTI. I disagree with this position. I find that the March of Dimes matter should be considered a previous conviction. The March of Dimes sentencing hearing took place in August 2017. The Information before me respecting NTI includes a time period from February 2016-March 2023.

[12]   The fraudulent documents signed by Ms. Manji were given to NTI in 2016. However, the benefits, which this fraudulent representation facilitated, continued into 2023. Ms. Manji is entirely responsible for this continuing offence (including the benefits received by the daughters), facts which Defence counsel has admitted. Thus, Ms. Manji does not appear before me as a first offender. Even if I am wrong in this analysis, I consider Ms. Manji’s March of Dimes fraud to be a major indicator of her character as an offender, in terms of predisposition to fraud.

[13]   Further, the Defence has filed 4 letters explaining Ms. Manji and her daughter’s personal circumstances:

[14]   I have considered these letters that have been filed with the court and Defence counsel asks me to seal them or, alternatively, to redact them, on the basis that they involve personal information about Ms. Manji and her daughter. I decline. These letters will be part of the public record. In making this ruling, I have considered Sherman Estate v. Donovan, 2021 SCC 25 (CanLII), R v. T.W.W., 2024 SCC 19 and the case provided by Crown Counsel.  Ms. Manji’s personal situation should not be exempt from public scrutiny when she, herself, through her counsel, has filed these materials. Even if the daughter is an innocent victim to this fraud, she benefitted from the fraud. She should not be exempt from public scrutiny absent pressing medical concerns which the current letter does not support.

[15]   In a nutshell, Defence Counsel portrays Ms. Manji as a woman of modest means receiving minimum wage who has suffered abuse in the past and is receiving counselling for her current stress. In addition, counsel told me – and I am quoting counsel’s own words here - that when Ms. Manji lived in Iqaluit in the 1990s, she had a “pro social impact on the people of Nunavut” and that she “sat in as a parent with the Noah family.” 

[16]   In mitigation of sentence counsel has characterized Ms. Manji’s fraud as an economic crime for which she has made almost complete restitution. In further mitigation, counsel says that Ms. Manji committed this offence not for simple profit or to facilitate further illegal or anti-social behaviour but rather, as a loving mother, for the benefit of her children.

[17]   Respectfully, but to be blunt, I have difficulty accepting any of these submissions as mitigating factors. In my view, the only mitigating factor in this case is Ms. Manji’s guilty plea. I do not consider the fact that partial restitution has been made to be a mitigating factor, at all. If such were the case then a fraudster with means could essentially buy their way into a reduced prison term, whereas an impecunious fraudster would serve the longer term.

[18]   I have suspicions about Ms. Manji’s financial situation. I have difficulty accepting that Ms. Manji is a woman of modest means who gets by on a minimum or near minimum wage. As I noted earlier, I am told that Ms. Manji pays herself by managing properties that she owns in Toronto. I am, however, given no specifics as to the value of these Toronto assets.

[19]   I do note that Ms. Manji was able to pay back $ 130,000.00 in restitution and that she is also willing and able as well to pay another $ 28,000.00 if I make an additional stand-alone restitution order in favor of Kakivak. Ms. Manji is entitled to oppose such an order, but this would entail an examination of her entire financial situation in relation to which I am already suspicious.

[20]   Respecting Ms. Manji’s ongoing counselling I have Ms. Jones’ letter before me. It is clear, however, that the social worker’s letter, which includes doctor’s diagnosis and prognosis, is based upon a self-report of what Ms. Manji has told her. I have no independent source to indicate the veracity of Ms. Manji’s symptoms. In most cases this would not be important. However, Ms. Manji is a proven fraudster, and I am therefore suspicious of what she may have told her doctor, period. I do accept that Ms. Manji suffers from anxiety and stress, but it is obvious that much of this is simply a result of her behaviour by committing and being caught, not just once, but now twice in fraudulent schemes.

[21]   I also reject the submission that while she lived in Iqaluit she had a positive presence on the people of Nunavut. There is no evidence to support such a claim. Similarly, I reject the submission that Ms. Manji “stood in as a parent” with the Noah family. In this regard, Noah Noah’s victim impact evidence speaks for itself.

[22]   Similarly, and concerning Ms. Manji’s claim in her written pleadings that she has been abused, again I have no evidence that such is the case. Indeed, the only reference to any domestic abuse in Ms. Manji’s case comes from the transcript of the March of Dimes sentencing hearing where documentation from Ms. Manji’s civil proceedings involving her husband show that while Ms. Manji had previously called the police, it was Ms. Manji herself who was arrested.

[23]   Respecting Defence Counsel’s characterization of the offence before me, and the impact of Ms. Manji’s fraud upon her children, I would make the following comments. First, Ms. Manji’s offence of defrauding NTI is not a simple white collar economic crime. As Ms. Belleau, an Inuk lawyer with NTI said to the Court “Indigenous identity theft is modern day assimilation”. Ms. Belleau said that the pretenders who claim Inuit status see their crime only as a ‘benefit in the form of a dollar sign,’ but the impact of this type of offence is greater than the immediate gain to the pretender.

[24]   The theft of Indigenous identity is now a topic of much discussion in Canada because of several notorious cases or instances where it has been exposed, albeit not in a criminal context or setting. Ms. Manji of course is not responsible for what other people have done (whether they have committed crimes or not) nor is the behaviour of other pretenders in Canada an aggravating circumstance in fixing Ms. Manji’s ultimate sentence.

[25]   That said, in my view, I agree with the sentiment of NTI’s counsel, Ms. Belleau, that theft of Indigenous identity is a uniquely serious form of fraud. In my view Ms. Manji’s offence is not simply a case of white-collar crime where NTI, as a corporation has suffered an economic loss, and where restitution has been made to correct the damage. Such a characterization plays down the significance of Ms. Manji’s crime.

[26]   In my view NTI is not the true or ultimate victim in this case. Legally, NTI is the immediate commercial victim. The true victims of Ms. Manji’s crime are the Inuit of Nunavut who are simply represented by NTI. Ms. Manji has defrauded the Inuit of Nunavut by stealing their identity. She has further victimized the Noah family and the memory of Kitty Noah. This is an egregious example of the exploitation of Indigenous peoples.

[27]   Finally – and I think this is important because it has largely been overlooked by both counsel in this case – Ms. Manji has victimized her own children, her two daughters whose lives and careers have been severely compromised by her fraud.

[28]   Ms. Manji has for some reason filed material indicating that one of her daughters has been experiencing trauma and is taking counselling. It is clear to me, however, that the daughter’s trauma is a result of Ms. Manji’s fraud being exposed to the public. Ms. Manji’s daughters are also her victims and accordingly I do not accept the counsel’s submission that the motive for Ms. Manji’s fraud to benefit her daughters is a mitigating factor. In my view, it is to the contrary, an aggravating factor.

[29]   Respecting the appropriate sentence for Ms. Manji, in my view, the Crown’s position of a jail term between 18-24 months is not sufficiently denunciatory of her crime. I have noted, however, that included in the caselaw precedents filed by the Crown, were 2 cases where jail terms of 36 months were imposed upon offenders who had a previous fraud conviction.

[30]   In my view, the appropriation of Indigenous identity must be denounced in the strongest of terms. In addition, general deterrence must be emphasized in any case involving fraud. Fraudsters pay attention to what happens to other fraudsters, and they are deterred from such activity when significant jail terms are imposed. Ms. Manji’s case must serve as a signal to any future Indigenous pretender that the false appropriation of Indigenous identity in a criminal context, will draw a significant penalty.

[31]   In Ms. Manji’s case, in my view, only a penitentiary term can satisfy both these sentencing objectives of general deterrence and denunciation. Ms. Karima Manji, may you please stand for the imposition of your sentence, Ms. Manji, respectfully, I find that you are both a habitual and persistent fraudster. I am aware that you have never served any previous jail term, and I must be mindful, therefore, of your prospects for rehabilitation. I also note that you entered a guilty plea very early in these proceedings and I must be mindful of the principle of judicial restraint in imposing sentence. I must, therefore, temper justice with mercy. Accordingly, Ms. Mangi, I sentence you to 36 months of imprisonment in a federal penitentiary. I also make a stand-alone restitution order of $28,254.05 in favour of Kakivak Association. Ms. Manji, you may take a seat. If there’s nothing further from counsel, I will adjourn Court.